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Abstract
We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the
Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is
stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly
weak) majority of voters. The second notion is called local stability (introduced
in this paper): A size-k committee is locally stable in an election with n voters if
there is no candidate c and no group of more than n
k+1 voters such that each voter
in this group prefers c to each committee member. We argue that Gehrlein-stable
committees are appropriate for shortlisting tasks, and that locally stable committees
are better suited for applications that require proportional representation. The goal
of this paper is to analyze these notions in detail, explore their compatibility with
notions of proportionality, and investigate the computational complexity of related
algorithmic tasks.
1 Introduction
The notion of a Condorcet winner is among the most important ones in (computational)
social choice [1, 6]. Consider a group of agents, each with a preference order over a given
set of candidates. The Condorcet condition says that if there exists a candidate c that is
preferred to every other candidate by a majority of agents (perhaps a different majority
in each case), then this candidate c should be seen as the collectively best option. Such
a candidate is known as the Condorcet winner.
In single-winner elections, that is, in settings where the goal is to choose one candidate
(presidential elections are a prime example here), there are strong arguments for choosing
a Condorcet winner whenever it exists. For example, in case of presidential elections if
a Condorcet winner existed but was not chosen as the country’s president, a majority of
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the voters might revolt. (We note, however, that there are also arguments against rules
that choose Condorcet winners whenever they exist: for example, such rules suffer from
the no-show paradox [19, 7] and fail the reinforcement axiom [20].)
In this paper, we consider multiwinner elections, that is, settings where instead of
choosing a single winner (say, the president) we choose a collective body of a given size
(say, a parliament). The goal of our paper is to analyze generalizations of the concept of
a Condorcet winner to multiwinner elections. There are several natural definitions of “a
Condorcet committee” and we consider their merits and application domains (we write
“Condorcet committee” in quotes because several notions could be seen as deserving this
term and, thus, eventually we do not use it for any of them).
First, we can take the approach of Gehrlein [15] and Ratliff [21], where we want the
committee to be a collection of high-quality individuals who do not necessarily need to
cooperate with each other (this is a natural approach, e.g., when we are shortlisting a
group of people for an academic position or for some prize [3, 10]). In this case, each
member of the “Condorcet committee” should be preferred by a majority of voters to all
the non-members.
Alternatively, there is the approach of Fishburn [13] (also analyzed from an algorith-
mic perspective by Darmann [9]), where we assume that the committee members have to
work so closely with each other that it only makes sense to consider voters’ preferences
over entire committees rather than over individual candidates (this would be natural in
selecting, e.g., small working groups). In this case, a “Condorcet committee” is a com-
mittee that is preferred to every other committee by a majority of voters. However, this
approach is of limited use when voters express their preferences over individual candi-
dates: while such preferences can be lifted to preferences over committees, e.g., by using
a scoring function, in the presence of strong synergies among the committee members the
induced preferences over committees are unlikely to offer a good approximation of voters’
true preferences. Therefore, we do not pursue this approach in our work.
Finally, there is a middle-ground approach, proposed by Elkind et al. [11], where the
committee members focus on representing the voters (this is the case, e.g., in parliamen-
tary elections). In this case, we compare committees against single candidates: We say
that a voter i prefers committee W to some candidate c if there exists a candidate w in
W (who can be seen as the representative of this voter) such that i prefers w to c. Now
we could say that a “Condorcet committee” is one that is preferred to each candidate
outside the committee by a majority of voters. Indeed, Elkind et al. [11] refer to such
committees as Condorcet winning sets.
Elkind et al. [11] were unable to find an election with no Condorcet winning set of size
three; their empirical results suggest that such elections are very unlikely. Thus, to use
their approach in order to select large committees in a meaningful way, we should focus
on committees that are preferred to unselected candidates by a large fraction of voters. In
particular, we argue that when n voters select k candidates, the winning committee should
be preferred to each non-member by roughly n− n
k
voters. The resulting concept, which
we call local stability, can be seen as a translation of the notion of justified representation
by Aziz et al. [2] from the world of approval-based elections to ranked-ballot elections.
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We also consider a stronger variant of this notion, which can be seen as an analogue of
extended justified representation from the work of Aziz et al. [2].
The goal of our work is to contrast the approach based on the ideas of Gehrlein [15] and
Ratliff [21], which we call Gehrlein stability, with the approach based on Condorcet win-
ning sets (i.e., local stability). By considering several restricted domains (single-peaked,
single-crossing, and a restriction implied by the existence of political parties), we show
that Gehrlein stable committees are very well-suited for shortlisting (as already suggested
by Barbera´ and Coelho [3]), whereas locally stable committees are better at providing
proportional representation. From the point of view of the computational complexity,
while in both cases we show NP-hardness of testing the existence of a respective “Con-
dorcet committee”, we discover that a variant of the Gehrlein–Ratliff approach leads to
a polynomial-time algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
For every natural number p, we let [p] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , p}.
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and
V = (v1, . . . , vn) is a list of voters; we write |V | to denote the number of voters in V .
Each voter v ∈ V is endowed with a linear preference order over C, denoted by ≻v. For
ℓ ∈ [m] we write topℓ(v) to denote ℓ candidates most preferred by v. We write top(v) to
denote the single most preferred candidate of voter v, i.e., top1(v) = {top(v)}, and for
each c ∈ C \ top(v) it holds that top(v) ≻v c. We write a ≻v b ≻v . . . to indicate that
v ranks a first and b second, followed by all the other candidates in an arbitrary order.
Given two disjoint subsets of candidates S, T ⊆ C, S∩T = ∅, we write S ≻v T to indicate
that v prefers each candidate in S to each candidate in T .
A committee is a subset of C. Amultiwinner voting ruleR takes an election E = (C, V )
and a positive integer k with k ≤ |C| as its input, and outputs a non-empty collection
of size-k committees. A multiwinner rule R is said to be resolute if the set R(E, k) is a
singleton for each election E = (C, V ) and each committee size k.
Given an election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n and two candidates c, d ∈ C, we say that
c wins the pairwise election between c and d if more than n
2
voters in V prefer c to d; if
exactly n
2
voters in V prefer c to d, we say that the pairwise election between c and d is
tied. The majority graph of an election E = (C, V ) is a directed graph M(E) with vertex
set C and the following edge set:
{
(c, d) ∈ C2 | c wins the pairwise election between c and d
}
.
Observe that if the number of voters n is odd, then M(E) is a tournament, i.e., for each
pair of candidates c, d ∈ C exactly one of their connecting edges, (c, d) or (d, c), is present
in M(E). We will also consider the weak majority graph of E, which we denote by W (E):
this is the directed graph obtained from M(E) by adding edges (c, d) and (d, c) for each
pair of candidates c, d such that the pairwise election between c and d is tied. A candidate
c is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election E = (C, V ) if the outdegree of c in M(E)
3
is |C| − 1; c is said to be a weak Condorcet winner of E if the outdegree of c in W (E) is
|C| − 1.
3 Gehrlein Stability and Local Stability
Gehrlein [15] proposed a simple, natural extension of the notion of a weak Condorcet
winner to the case of multiwinner elections, and a similar definition was subsequently
introduced by Ratliff [21]. We recall and discuss Gehrlein’s definition, and then put
forward a different approach to defining good committees, which is inspired by the recent
work on Condorcet winning sets [11] and on justified representation in approval-based
committee elections [2].
3.1 Gehrlein Stability
Gehrlein [15] and Ratliff [21] base their approach on the following idea: a committee is
unstable if there exists a majority of voters who prefer a candidate that is not currently
in the committee to some current committee member.
Definition 1 (Gehrlein [15]; Ratliff [21]). Consider an election E = (C, V ). A committee
S ⊆ C is weakly Gehrlein-stable if for each committee member c ∈ S and each non-
member d ∈ C \ S it holds that c wins or ties the pairwise election between c and d.
Committee S is strongly Gehrlein-stable if for each c ∈ S and each d 6∈ S the pairwise
election between c and d is won by c.
By definition, each strongly Gehrlein-stable committee is also weakly Gehrlein-stable,
and the two notions are equivalent if the majority graph M(E) is a tournament. Fur-
ther, a strongly (respectively, weakly) Gehrlein-stable committee of size one is simply a
Condorcet winner (respectively, a weak Condorcet winner) of a given election. More gen-
erally, each member of a strongly (respectively, weakly) Gehrlein-stable committee would
be a Condorcet winner (respectively, a weak Condorcet winner) should the other com-
mittee members be removed from the election. Note also that given a committee S, it is
straightforward to verify if it is strongly (respectively, weakly) Gehrlein-stable: it suffices
to check that there is no candidate in C \ S that ties or defeats (respectively, defeats)
some member of S in their pairwise election.
Gehrlein stability has received some attention in the literature. In particular,
Ratliff [21], Coelho [8], and, very recently, Kamwa [17], proposed and analyzed a num-
ber of multiwinner rules that satisfy weak Gehrlein stability, i.e., elect weakly Gehrlein
stable committees whenever they exist. These rules can be seen as analogues of classic
single-winner Condorcet-consistent rules, such as Maximin or Copeland’s rule (see, e.g.,
the survey by Zwicker [26] for their definitions). Specifically, each of these rules is based
on a function that assigns non-negative scores to committees in such a way that commit-
tees with score 0 are exactly the weakly Gehrlein-stable committees; it then outputs the
committees with the minimum score.
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Gehrlein Stability and Majority Graphs Gehrlein stability is closely related to a
classic tournament solution concept, namely, the top cycle (see, e.g., the survey by Brandt,
Brill and Harrenstein [5] for an overview of tournament solution concepts). Indeed, if the
majority graph M(E) is a tournament, then every top cycle in M(E) is a Gehrlein-stable
committee (recall that for tournaments weak Gehrlein stability is equivalent to strong
Gehrlein stability, so we use the term ‘Gehrlein stability’ to refer to both notions). In the
presence of ties, the relevant solution concepts are the Smith set and the Schwarz set: the
former corresponds to a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee and the latter corresponds to
a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee.
However, there is an important difference between Gehrlein committees and each of
these tournament solution concepts: When computing a tournament solution, we aim to
minimize the number of elements in the winning set, whereas in the context of multiwinner
elections our goal is to find a weakly/strongly Gehrlein-stable committee of a given size.
This difference has interesting algorithmic implications. While it is easy to find a Smith
set for a given tournament, in Section 5 we show that it is NP-hard to determine if a
given election admits a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of a given size. On the other
hand, we can extend the existing algorithm for finding a Schwarz set to identify a strongly
Gehrlein-stable committee. We defer most of our computational results until Section 5,
but we present the proof of this result here because it implicitly provides a very useful
characterization of strongly Gehrlein-stable committees.
Theorem 1. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a positive integer k with k ≤ |C|, we can
decide in polynomial time whether E admits a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee of size
k. Moreover, if such a committee exists, then it is unique.
Proof. Given an election E = (C, V ), we let C = {C1, . . . , Cr} be the list of strongly
connected components of W (E); note that a graph can be decomposed into strongly
connected components in polynomial time. Given two candidates a, b ∈ C, we write
a→ b if W (E) contains a directed path from a to b.
Consider two distinct sets Ci, Cj ∈ C and two candidates a ∈ Ci, b ∈ Cj . Note that
the pairwise election between a and b cannot be tied, since otherwise a and b would be in
the same set. Suppose without loss of generality that a beats b in their pairwise election.
Then for each a′ ∈ Ci, b
′ ∈ Cj we have a
′ → a, a → b, b → b′ and hence by transitivity
a′ → b′. On the other hand, we cannot have b′ → a′, as this would mean that a′ and b′
belong to the same connected component of W (E). Thus, we can define a total order on
C as follows: for Ci, Cj ∈ C we set Ci < Cj if i 6= j and a→ b for each a ∈ Ci, b ∈ Cj . By
the argument above, < is indeed a total order on C; we can renumber the elements of C
so that C1 < · · · < Cr. Then for a ∈ Ci, b ∈ Cj we have a→ b if and only if i ≤ j.
Now, consider a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee S. Suppose that a→ b and b ∈ S.
It is easy to see that a ∈ S; this follows by induction on the length of the shortest path
from a to b in W (E). Hence, every strongly Gehrlein-stable committee is of the form⋃
i≤sCi for some s ∈ [r]. Thus, there is a strong Gehrlein committee of size k if and only
if
∑s
i=1 |Ci| = k for some s ∈ [r]. This argument also shows that a strongly Gehrlein-stable
committee of a given size is unique.
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We have argued that for tournaments the notions of weak Gehrlein stability and strong
Gehrlein stability coincide. We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Consider an election E = (C, V ). If W (E) is a tournament, we can decide
in polynomial time whether E has a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of a given size.
Moreover, if such a committee exists, it is unique.
Gehrlein Stability and Enlargement Consistency Interestingly, Barbera´ and
Coelho [3] have shown that weak Gehrlein stability is incompatible with enlargement
consistency : For every resolute multiwinner rule R that elects a weakly Gehrlein-stable
committee whenever such a committee exists, there exists an election E and committee
size k such that the only committee in R(E, k) is not a subset of the only committee in
R(E, k + 1).1 While this result means that such rules are not well-suited for shortlisting
tasks [3, 10], it only holds for weak Gehrlein stability and not for strong Gehrlein stability.
Indeed, let us consider the following multiwinner variant of the Copeland rule (it is
very similar to the NED rule of Coelho [8] and we will call it strong-NED). Given an
election E, the score of a candidate is its outdegree in M(E). Strong-NED chooses the
committee of k candidates with the highest scores (to match the framework of Barbera´
and Coelho [3], the rule should be resolute and so we break ties lexicographically). By
its very definition, strong-NED satisfies enlargement consistency. Further, if there is a
committee W that is strongly Gehrlein-stable, then strong-NED chooses this committee
(if there arem candidates in total, then the outdegree of each candidate fromW is at least
m− |W |, whereas the outdegree of each candidate outside of W is at most m− |W | − 1;
Barbera´ and Coelho [3] also gave this argument, but assuming an odd number of voters).
3.2 Local Stability
An important feature of Gehrlein stability is that it is strongly driven by the majority
opinions. Suppose, for instance, that a group of 1000 voters is to elect 10 representatives
from the set {c1, . . . , c20}, and the society is strongly polarized: 501 voters rank the
candidates as c1 ≻ · · · ≻ c20, whereas the remaining 499 voters rank the candidates
as c20 ≻ · · · ≻ c1. Then the unique Gehrlein-stable committee of size 10 consists of
candidates c1, . . . , c10, and the preferences of 499 voters are effectively ignored. While
this is appropriate in some settings, in other cases we may want to ensure that candidates
who are well-liked by significant minorities of voters are also elected.
Aziz et al. [2] formalize this idea in the context of approval voting, where each voter
submits a set of candidates that she approves of (rather than a ranked ballot). Specifically,
they say that committee S, |S| = k, provides justified representation in an election (C, V )
with |V | = n, where each voter i is associated with an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C, if there
is no group of voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ ⌈n
k
⌉ such that Ai ∩ S = ∅ for each i ∈ V
′, yet
there exists a candidate c ∈ C \ S approved by all voters in V ′. Informally speaking,
this definition requires that each ‘cohesive’ group of voters of size at least q = ⌈n
k
⌉ is
1Enlargement consistency is defined for resolute rules only. An analogue of this notion for non-resolute
rules was introduced by Elkind et al. [10] under the name of committee monotonicity.
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represented in the committee. The choice of threshold q = ⌈n
k
⌉ (known as the Hare
quota) is natural in the context of approval voting: it ensures that, when the electorate
is composed of k equal-sized groups of voters, with sets of candidates approved by each
group being pairwise disjoint, each group is allocated a representative.
Extending this idea to ordinal ballots and to an arbitrary threshold q, we obtain the
following definition.
Definition 2. Consider an election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n and a positive value q ∈ Q.
A committee S violates local stability for quota q if there exists a group V ∗ ⊆ V with
|V ∗| ≥ q and a candidate c ∈ C \S such that each voter from V ∗ prefers c to each member
of S; otherwise, S provides local stability for quota q.
Note that, while in the context of approval voting the notion of group cohesiveness
can be defined in absolute terms (a group is considered cohesive if there is a candidate
approved by all group members), for ranked ballots a cohesive group is defined relative to
a given committee (a group is cohesive with respect to S if all its members prefer some
candidate to S). Another important difference between the two settings is that, while a
committee that provides justified representation is guaranteed to exist and can be found
in polynomial time [2], a committee that provides local stability may fail to exist, even if
we use the same value of the quota, i.e., q = ⌈n
k
⌉.
Example 1. Fix an integer d ≥ 2; let X = {x1, . . . , xd}, Y = {y1, . . . , yd}, Z =
{z1, . . . , zd}, and set C = {a, b}∪X∪Y ∪Z. There are 4 voters with preferences a ≻ b ≻ · · ·
and 4 voters with preferences b ≻ a ≻ · · · . Also, for each i ∈ [d], there are two voters
with preferences xi ≻ yi ≻ zi ≻ · · · , two voters with preferences yi ≻ zi ≻ xi ≻ · · · , and
two voters with preferences zi ≻ xi ≻ yi ≻ · · · . Altogether, we have n = 6d + 8 voters.
Set k = 2d + 1; then for d ≥ 2 we obtain ⌈n
k
⌉ = 4. We will now argue that this election
admits no locally stable committee of size k for quota q = ⌈n
k
⌉. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that S is a locally stable committee of size k for this value of the quota.
Note first that for each i ∈ [d] we have |{xi, yi, zi} ∩ S| ≥ 2. Indeed, suppose that this
is not the case for some i ∈ [d]. By symmetry, we can assume without loss of generality
that yi, zi 6∈ S. However, then there are 4 voters who prefer zi to every member of the
committee, a contradiction with local stability. Thus, S contains at least 2d candidates
in X ∪Y ∪Z and hence |S∩{a, b}| ≤ 1. Thus at least one of a or b does not belong to the
committee and either the four a ≻ b ≻ · · · voters or the four b ≻ a ≻ · · · voter witness
that S is not locally stable. or the second four voters
In Section 5, we will use the idea from Example 1 to argue that it is NP-hard to decide
whether a given election admits a locally stable committee.
Definition 2 does not specify a value of the quota q. Intuitively, the considerations
that should determine the choice of quota are the same as for Single Transferable Vote
(STV), and one can choose any of the quotas that are used for STV (see, e.g., the survey
by Tideman [25]). In particular, for k = 1 and the Hare quota q = ⌈n
k
⌉ we obtain Pareto
optimality: a committee {a} of size k = 1 is locally stable for quota ⌈n
k
⌉ if there is no
other candidate c such that all voters prefer c to a. For k = 1 and q = ⌈ n
k+1
⌉ (the
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Hagenbach-Bischoff quota), locally stable committees for quota q are those whose unique
element is a weak Condorcet winner; for k = 1 and q = ⌊ n
k+1
⌋ + 1 (the Droop quota), a
locally stable committee for quota q has the Condorcet winner as its only member.
Remark 1. For k = 2 and q =
⌈
n
k
⌉
, locally stable committees are closely related to
Condorcet winning sets, as defined by Elkind et al. [11], and, more generally, locally
stable committees are related to θ-winning sets [11]. Elkind et al. [11] say that a set of
candidates S is a θ-winning set in an election (C, V ) with |V | = n if for each candidate
c ∈ C \ S there are more than θn voters who prefer some member of S to c; a 1
2
-winning
set is called a Condorcet winning set. Importantly, unlike locally stable committees, θ-
winning sets are defined in terms of strict inequalities. If we replace ‘more than θn’ with
‘at least θn’ in the definition of Elkind et al. [11], we obtain the definition of local stability
for quota q = (1− θ)n. Elkind et al. [11] define a voting rule that for a given election E
and committee size k outputs a size-k θ-winning set for the smallest possible θ. This rule,
by definition, outputs locally stable committees whenever they exist. We remark that the
15-voter, 15-candidate election described by Elkind et al. [11] is an example of an election
with no locally stable committee for q =
⌈
n
k
⌉
and k = 2, thus complementing Example 1
(which works for odd k ≥ 5).
For concreteness, from now on we fix the quota to be q = ⌊ n
k+1
⌋+1 (the Droop quota),
and use the expression ‘locally stable committee’ to refer to locally stable committees for
this value of the quota. However, some of our results extend to other values of q as well.
Full Local Stability Aziz et al. [2] also proposed the notion of extended justified repre-
sentation, which deals with larger groups of voters that, intuitively, are entitled to more
than a single representative. To apply their idea to ranked ballots, we need to explain
how voters evaluate possible deviations. We require a new committee to be a Pareto
improvement over the old one: given a committee S and a size-ℓ set of candidates T , we
say that a voter v prefers T to S if there is a bijection µ : T → topℓ(S) such that for
each c ∈ T voter v weakly prefers c to µ(c) and for some c ∈ T voter v strictly prefers
c to µ(c). We now present our analogue of extended justified representation for ranked
ballots, which we call full local stability.
Definition 3. Consider an election (C, V ) with |V | = n. We say that a committee S,
|S| = k, violates ℓ-local stability for ℓ ∈ [k] if there exists a group of voters V ∗ ⊆ V with
|V ∗| ≥
⌊
ℓ·n
k+1
⌋
+ 1 and a set of ℓ candidates T , such that each voter v ∈ V ∗ prefers T to
S; otherwise, S provides ℓ-local stability. A committee S with |S| = k provides full local
stability if it provides ℓ-local stability for all ℓ ∈ [k].
By construction, 1-local stability is simply local stability, and hence every committee
that provides full local stability also provides local stability. Local stability and full local
stability extend from committees to voting rules in a natural way.
Definition 4. A multiwinner voting rule R satisfies (full) local stability if for every
election E = (C, V ) and every target committee size k such that in E the set of size-k
committees that provide (full) local stability is not empty, it holds that every committee in
R(E) provides (full) local stability.
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Weakly/strongly Gehrlein-stable rules can be defined in a similar manner.
Solid Coalitions and Dummett’s Proportionality Let us examine the relation
between (full) local stability, and the solid coalitions property and Dummett’s propor-
tionality. Both these notions were used by Elkind et al. [10] as indicators of voting rules’
ability to find committees that represent voters proportionally (however, we give a slightly
different definition than they give; see explanation below).
Definition 5. Consider an election (C, V ) with |V | = n. We say that a committee S,
|S| = k, violates the solid coalitions property if there exists a candidate c /∈ S who is
ranked first by some ⌈n
k
⌉ voters. We say that a committee S, |S| = k, violates Dummett’s
proportionality if there exists a set of ℓ candidates Q with Q \ S 6= ∅ and a set of ⌈ ℓn
k
⌉
voters V such that for each voter v ∈ V it holds that topℓ(v) = Q.
Proposition 2. A locally stable committee satisfies the solid coalitions property; a fully
locally stable committee satisfies Dummett’s proportionality.
Proof. We present the proof for local stability; for full local stability the same argument
can be used. Consider an election E, a target committee size k, and a committee S such
that some ⌈n
k
⌉ voters rank a candidate c ∈ C\S first. Since n
k
> n
k+1
, also ⌈n
k
⌉ ≥ ⌊ n
k+1
⌋+1,
and so the same group of voters witnesses that S violates local stability.
The solid coalitions property and Dummett’s proportionality are usually defined as
properties of multiwinner rules. In contrast, Definition 5 treats them as properties of
coalitions, which is essential for establishing a relation such as the one given in Proposi-
tion 2. Indeed, local stability as the property of a rule puts no restrictions on the output of
the rule for profiles for which there exists no locally stable committees and, in particular,
for such profiles local stability does not guarantee the solid coalitions property.
4 Three Restricted Domains
In Section 3 we have argued that Gehrlein stability is a majoritarian notion, whereas
local stability is directed towards proportional representation. Now we reinforce this
intuition by describing the structure of Gehrlein-stable and locally stable committees
for three well-studied restricted preference domains. Namely, we consider single-crossing
elections, single-peaked elections, and elections where the voters have preferences over
parties (modeled as large sets of ‘similar’ candidates).
The following observation will be useful in our analysis. Consider an election E =
(C, V ) for which M(E) is a transitive tournament, i.e., if (a, b) and (b, c) are edges of
M(E) then (a, c) is also an edge of M(E). In such a case, the set of ordered pairs (a, b)
such that (a, b) ∈M(E) is a linear order on C and we refer to it as the majority preference
order. Given a positive integer k, we let the centrist committee Scenter consist of the top
k candidates in the majority preference order. Theorem 1 implies the following simple
observation.
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Proposition 3. If M(E) is transitive then for each committee size k, Scenter is strongly
Gehrlein-stable.
It is well known that if the number of voters is odd and the election is either single-
peaked or single-crossing (see definitions below), then M(E) is a transitive tournament.
Thus Proposition 3 is very useful in such settings.
4.1 Single-Crossing Preferences
The notion of single-crossing preferences was proposed by Mirrlees [18] and Roberts [22].
Informally speaking, an election is single-crossing if (the voters can be ordered in such a
way that) as we move from the first voter to the last one, the relative order within each
pair of candidates changes at most once. For a review of examples where single-crossing
preferences can arise, we refer the reader to the work of Saporiti and Tohme´ [24].
Definition 6. An election (C, V ) with V = (v1, . . . , vn) is single-crossing
2 if for each pair
of candidates a, b ∈ C such that v1 prefers a over b we have {i | a ≻vi b} = [t] for some
t ∈ [n].
Single-crossing elections have many desirable properties. In the context of our work,
the most important one is that if E = (C, V ) is a single-crossing election with an odd
number of voters, then M(E) is a transitive tournament. Moreover if |V | = 2n′ + 1,
the majority preference order coincides with the preferences of the (n′ + 1)-st voter [23].
By Proposition 3, this means that for single-crossing elections with an odd number of
voters the centrist committee exists, is strongly Gehrlein-stable, and consists of the top k
candidates in the preference ranking of the median voter, which justifies the term centrist
committee.
Proposition 4. For a single-crossing election with an odd number of voters, the centrist
committee is strongly Gehrlein-stable.
Locally stable committees turn out to be very different. Let E = (C, V ) be a single-
crossing election with |V | = n, and let k be the target committee size; then the Droop
quota for E is q =
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
+1. We say that a size-k committee S is single-crossing uniform
for E if for each ℓ ∈ [k] it contains the candidate ranked first by voter vℓ·q. Note that
a single-crossing uniform committee need not be unique: e.g., if all the voters rank the
same candidate first, then every committee containing this candidate is single-crossing
uniform.
Example 2. Figure 1 shows a single-crossing election with 15 voters over the candidate
set C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k}. The first voter ranks the candidates in the alphabetic
order, and the last voter ranks them in the reverse alphabetic order. For readability,
2Our definition of single-crossing elections assumes that the order of voters is fixed. More commonly,
an election is defined to be single-crossing if voters can be permuted so that the condition formulated in
Definition 6 holds. For our purposes, this distinction is not important, and the approach we chose makes
the presentation more compact.
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Figure 1: A single-crossing election (Example 2).
we list the top four-ranked candidates only. For the target committee size 4, the centrist
committee (marked with a rectangle) is {c, d, e, f}, and the unique single-crossing uniform
committee is {b, d, g, i} (marked with dashed ellipses). If we reorder the voters from v15
to v1, the unique single-crossing uniform committee is {c, d, h, j}.
We will now argue that single-crossing uniform committees are locally stable.
Proposition 5. For every single-crossing election E = (C, V ) and for every k ∈ [|C|] it
holds that every size-k single-crossing uniform committee for E is locally stable.
Proof. Fix a single-crossing election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n and a target committee size
k; set q =
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
+ 1. Consider a committee S, |S| = k, that is single-crossing uniform
with respect to E. We will show that S is locally stable.
Consider an arbitrary candidate c 6∈ S. Suppose first that some voter vi with i < q
ranks c above all candidates in S. Let a = top(vq). As a ∈ S and E is single-crossing,
each voter vj with j ≥ q prefers a to c. Thus, there are at most q− 1 voters who prefer c
to each member of S.
Now, suppose that some voter vi with ℓq < i < (ℓ + 1)q for some ℓ ∈ [k − 1] ranks
c above all candidates in S; let a = top(vℓ·q), b = top(v(ℓ+1)·q). By construction we have
a, b ∈ S and by the single-crossing property a 6= b (if a = b, then a and c would cross
more than once). Also, by the single-crossing property all voters vj with j ≤ ℓq rank a
above c and all voters vj′ with j
′ ≥ (ℓ+1)q rank b above c. Thus, there are at most q− 1
voters who prefer c to each member of S.
Finally, suppose that some voter vi with i > kq ranks c above all members of S; let
a = top(vk·q). We have a ∈ S and by the single-crossing property all voters vj with j ≤ kq
rank a above c. Thus, there are at most n−kq voters who may prefer c to a, and q > n
k+1
implies n− qk < n− nk
k+1
= n
k+1
< q. In each case, the number of voters who may prefer
c to all members of S is strictly less than q.
The following example shows that a single-crossing uniform committee can violate
Gehrlein stability and, similarly, that the centrist committee can violate local stability.
Example 3. Let C = {a, b, c}. Consider the single-crossing election where three voters
rank the candidates as a ≻ b ≻ c and four voters rank the candidates as c ≻ b ≻ a. Let
k = 2. We have
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
+ 1 = 3. The committee {a, c} is single-crossing uniform for this
election, yet four voters out of seven prefer b to a. The committee {b, c} is centrist, yet it
is not locally stable since there are q = 3 voters who prefer a to both b and c.
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4.2 Single-Peaked Preferences
The class of single-peaked preferences, first introduced by Black [4], is perhaps the most
extensively studied restricted preference domain.
Definition 7. Let ✁ be an order over C. We say that an election E = (C, V ) is single-
peaked with respect to ✁ if for each voter v ∈ V and for each pair of candidates a, b ∈ C
such that top(v) ✁ a ✁ b or b ✁ a ✁ top(v) it holds that a ≻v b. We will refer to ✁ as a
societal axis for E.
Just as in single-crossing elections, in single-peaked elections with an odd number
of voters the majority preference order is transitive and hence the centrist committee is
well-defined and strongly Gehrlein-stable.
Proposition 6. For a single-peaked election with an odd number of voters, the centrist
committee is strongly Gehrlein-stable.
Moreover, we can define an analogue of a single-crossing uniform committee for single-
peaked elections. To this end, given an election E = (C, V ) that is single-peaked with
respect to the societal axis ✁, we reorder the voters so that for the new order V ′ =
(v′1, . . . , v
′
n) it holds that top(v
′
i) ✁ top(v
′
j) implies i < j; we say that an order of voters
V ′ that has this property is ✁-compatible. We can now use the same construction as in
Section 4.1. Specifically, given an election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n that is single-peaked
with respect to ✁ and a target committee size k, we set q =
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
+ 1, and say that a
committee S is single-peaked uniform for E if for some ✁-compatible order of voters V ′
we have top(v′ℓ·q) ∈ S for each ℓ ∈ [k].
Proposition 7. For every single-peaked election E = (C, V ) and for every k ∈ [|C|] it
holds that every size-k single-peaked uniform committee for E is locally stable.
Proof. Fix an election E = (C, V ) with |C| = m, |V | = n that is single-peaked with
respect to ✁ and a target committee size k. Assume without loss of generality that ✁
orders the candidates as c1 ✁ · · · ✁ cm and that V is ✁-compatible. Consider a single-
peaked uniform committee S of size k. Recall that q =
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
+ 1. Let cℓ = top(vq),
cr = top(vk·q). Consider a candidate cj 6∈ S.
Suppose first that j < ℓ. Then for each voter vi with i ≥ q the candidate top(vi) is
either cℓ or some candidate to the right of cℓ. Thus, all such voters prefer cℓ to cj , and
hence there can be at most q− 1 voters who prefer cj to each member of S. By a similar
argument, if j > r, there are at most n− kq < q voters who prefer cj to each member of
S.
It remains to consider the case ℓ < j < r. Let ℓ′ = max{t | t < j, ct ∈ S}, r
′ = min{t |
t > j, ct ∈ S}. Set i = max{i : top(vi·q) = cℓ′}; then the most preferred candidate of voter
v(i+1)·q is cr′ . Since the voters’ preferences are single-peaked with respect to ✁, vi·q and all
voters that precede her in V prefer cℓ′ to cj , and v(i+1)·q and all voters that appear after
her in V prefer cr′ to cj. Thus, only the voters in the set V
′ = {vi·q+1, . . . , vi·q+q−1} may
prefer cj to all voters in S, and |V
′| ≤ q − 1.
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Thus, for any choice of cj 6∈ S fewer than q voters prefer cj to all members of S, and
hence S is locally stable.
The proof of Proposition 7 is very similar to the proof of Proposition 5; we omit it
due to space constraints.
Observe that the election from Example 3 is single-peaked and committee {a, c} is
single-peaked uniform for that election. This shows that for single-peaked elections a
single-peaked uniform committee can violate Gehrlein stability and the centrist committee
can violate local stability.
4.3 Party-List Elections
When candidates are affiliated with political parties, it is not unusual for the voters’
preferences to be driven by party affiliations: a voter who associates herself with a political
party, ranks the candidates who belong to that party above all other candidates (but may
rank candidates that belong to other parties arbitrarily). In the presence of a strong
party discipline, we may additionally assume that all supporters of a given party rank
candidates from that party in the same way. We will call elections with this property
party-list elections.
Definition 8. An election E = (C, V ) is said to be a party-list election for a target
committee size k if we can partition the set of candidates C into pairwise disjoint sets
C1, . . . , Cp and the set of voters V into pairwise disjoint groups V1, . . . , Vp so that (i) |Ci| ≥
k for each i ∈ [p], (ii) each voter from Vi prefers each candidate in Ci to each candidate
in C \Ci, (iii) for each i ∈ [p] all voters in Vi order the candidates in Ci in the same way.
Party-list elections are helpful for understanding the difference between local stability
and full local stability. Indeed, when all voters have the same preferences over candidates,
local stability only ensures that a committee contains the unanimously most preferred can-
didate. In particular, the committee that consists of the single most preferred candidate
and the k − 1 least preferred candidates is locally stable. On the other hand, full local
stability imposes additional constraints. For example, when preferences are unanimous,
only the committee that consists of the k most preferred candidates satisfies full local
stability. Generalizing this observation, we will now show that in party-list elections a
fully locally stable committee selects representatives from each set Ci in proportion to the
number of voters in Vi.
Theorem 2. Let E = (C, V ) be a party-list election for a target committee size k, and
let (C1, . . . , Cp) and (V1, . . . , Vp) be the respective partitions of C and V . Then for each
i ∈ [p] every committee S of size k that provides full local stability for E contains all
candidates ranked in top
⌊
k · |Vi|
n
⌋
positions by the voters in Vi.
Proof. Consider a committee S, |S| = k, that provides full local stability for E. Fix
i ∈ [p], let ℓ =
⌊
k |Vi|
n
⌋
, and let C ′i be the set of candidates ranked in top ℓ positions by
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each voter in Vi. Let c be some candidate in C
′
i. If c 6∈ S, then voters in Vi prefer C
′
i to
S. As
|Vi| ≥
⌊
|Vi| · k
k + 1
⌋
+ 1 =
⌊
k
|Vi|
n
·
n
k + 1
⌋
+ 1 ≥
⌊
ℓ
n
k + 1
⌋
+ 1,
this would mean that S violates ℓ-local stability for E, a contradiction.
Example 4. Consider an election E = (C, V ) with C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z, X = {x1, . . . , x4},
Y = {y1, . . . , y4}, Z = {z1, . . . , z4} and |V | = 16, where 8 voters rank the candidates as
x1 ≻ x2 ≻ x3 ≻ x4 ≻ . . . , 4 voters rank the candidates as y1 ≻ y2 ≻ y3 ≻ y4 ≻ . . .
and 4 voters rank the candidates as z1 ≻ z2 ≻ z3 ≻ z4 ≻ . . . . Let k = 4. Clearly, E is
a party-list election. To provide full local stability, a committee has to contain the top
two candidates from X , the top candidate from Y and the top candidate from Z. Thus,
{x1, x2, y1, z1} is the unique fully locally stable committee.
On the other hand, observe that in an election where two parties have equal support,
i.e., when C and V are partitioned into C1, C2 and V1, V2, respectively, and |V1| = |V2|,
every committee S that contains the top candidate in C1 (according to voters in V1) and
the top candidate in C2 (according to voters in V2), provides local stability. Thus, local
stability can capture the idea of diversity to some extent, but not of fully proportional
representation.
Finally, note that Gehrlein stability does not offer any guarantees in the party-list
framework: If a party is supported by more than half of the voters, then the top k
candidates of this party form the unique strongly Gehrlein-stable committee; if a party is
supported by fewer than half of the voters then it is possible that none of its candidates
is in a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee.
5 Computational Complexity
We will now argue that finding stable committees can be computationally challenging,
both for weak Gehrlein stability and for local stability (recall that, in contrast, for strong
Gehrlein stability Theorem 1 provides a polynomial-time algorithm). Full local stability
appears to be even more demanding: we provide evidence that even checking whether a
given committee is fully locally stable is hard as well.
Theorem 3. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a target committee size k with k ≤ |C|,
it is NP-complete to decide if there exists a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of size k for
E.
Proof. It is immediate that this problem is in NP: given an election E = (C, V ), a target
committee size k, and a committee S with |S| = k, we can check that S has no incoming
edges in M(E).
To show hardness, we provide a reduction from Partially Ordered Knapsack.
An instance of this problem is given by a list of r ordered pairs of positive integers
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L = ((s1, w1), . . . , (sr, wr)), a capacity bound b, a target weight t, and a directed acyclic
graph Γ = ([r], A). It is a ‘yes’-instance if there is a subset of indices I ⊆ [r] such that∑
i∈I si ≤ b,
∑
i∈I wi ≥ t and for each directed edge (i, j) ∈ A it holds that j ∈ I implies
i ∈ I. This problem is strongly NP-complete; indeed, it remains NP-hard if si = wi and
wi ≤ r for all i ∈ [r] [16]. Note that if si = wi for all i ∈ [r], we can assume that b = t,
since otherwise we obviously have a ‘no’-instance.
Given an instance 〈L, b, t,Γ〉 of Partially Ordered Knapsack with L =
((s1, w1), . . . , (sr, wr)), si = wi, wi ≤ r for all i ∈ [r] and b = t, we construct an election
as follows. For each i ∈ [r], let Ci = {c
1
i , . . . , c
wi
i } and set C =
⋃
i∈[r]Ci. We construct
the set of voters V and the voters’ preferences so that the majority graph of the resulting
election (C, V ) has the following structure:
(1) for each i ∈ [r] the induced subgraph on Ci is a strongly connected tournament;
(2) for each (i, j) ∈ A there is an edge from each candidate in Ci to each candidate in
Cj;
(3) there are no other edges.
Using McGarvey’s theorem, we can ensure that the number of voters |V | is polynomial
in |C|; as we have wi ≤ r for all i ∈ [r], it follows that both the number of voters and the
number of candidates are polynomial in r. Finally, we let the target committee size k be
equal to the knapsack size t.
Let I be a witness that 〈L, b, t,Γ〉 is a ‘yes’-instance of Partially Ordered Knap-
sack. Then the set of candidates S =
⋃
i∈I Ci is a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of
size k: by construction, |S| =
∑
i∈I |Ci| =
∑
i∈I wi = t, and the partial order constraints
ensure that S has no incoming edges in the weighted majority graph of (C, V ).
Conversely, suppose that S is a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of size k for (C, V ).
Note first that for each i ∈ [r] it holds that Ci ∩S 6= ∅ implies Ci ⊆ S. Indeed, if we have
c ∈ Ci ∩ S, c
′ ∈ Ci \ S for some i ∈ [r] and some c, c
′ ∈ Ci then in the weighted majority
graph of (C, V ) there is a path from c′ to c. This path contains an edge that crosses
from Ci \S into Ci∩S, a contradiction with S being a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee.
Thus, S =
⋃
i∈I Ci for some I ⊆ [r], and we have
∑
i∈I wi =
∑
i∈I |Ci| = k = t. Moreover,
for each directed edge (i, j) ∈ A such that Cj ⊆ S we have Ci ⊆ S: indeed, the weighted
majority graph of (C, V ) contains edges from candidates in Ci to candidates in Cj, so if
Ci 6⊆ S, at least one of these edges would enter S, a contradiction with S being a weakly
Gehrlein-stable committee. It follows that I is a witness that we have started with a
‘yes’-instance of Partially Ordered Knapsack.
We obtain a similar result for locally stable committees.
Theorem 4. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a target committee size k, with k ≤ |C|,
it is NP-complete to decide if there exists a locally stable committee of size k for E.
Proof. It is easy to see that this problem is in NP: given an election (C, V ) together with
a target committee size k and a committee S with |S| = k, we can check for each c ∈ C \S
whether there exist at least
⌊
n
k
⌋
+ 1 voters who prefer c to each member of S.
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To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from 3-Regular Vertex Cover. Recall that an
instance of 3-Regular Vertex Cover is given by a 3-regular graph G = (V,E) and a
positive integer t; it is a ‘yes’-instance if G admits a vertex cover of size at most t, i.e., a
subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≤ t such that {ν, ν ′} ∩ V ′ 6= ∅ for each {ν, ν ′} ∈ E.
This problem is known to be NP-complete [14].
Consider an instance (G, t) of 3-Regular Vertex Cover with G = (V,E), V =
{ν1, . . . , νr}. Note that we have |E| = 1.5r, and we can assume that t < r − 1, since
otherwise (G, t) is trivially a ‘yes’-instance. Given (G, t), we construct an election as
follows. We set C = V ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, where X = {x1, . . . , x1.5r}, Y = {y1, . . . , y1.5r},
Z = {z1, . . . , z1.5r}. For each edge {ν, ν
′} ∈ E we construct one voter with preferences
ν ≻ ν ′ ≻ · · · and one voter with preferences ν ′ ≻ ν ≻ · · · ; we refer to these voters
as the edge voters. Also, for each j ∈ [1.5r] we construct two voters with preferences
xj ≻ yj ≻ zj ≻ · · · , two voters with preferences yj ≻ zj ≻ xj ≻ · · · , and two voters
with preferences zj ≻ xj ≻ yj ≻ · · · ; we refer to these voters as the xyz-voters. We set
k = t + 3r. Note that the number of voters in our instance is n = 2|E| + 6 · 1.5r = 12r.
Thus, using the fact that 0 < t < r − 1, we can bound n
k+1
as follows:
n
k + 1
>
12r
4r
= 3, and
n
k + 1
<
12r
3r
= 4.
Thus the Droop quota is q =
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
+ 1 = 4.
Now, suppose that V ′ is a vertex cover of size at most t; we can assume that |V ′| is
exactly t, as otherwise we can add arbitrary t−|V ′| vertices to V ′, and it remains a vertex
cover. Then S = V ′∪X ∪Y is a locally stable committee of size |S| = t+2 ·1.5r = t+3r.
Indeed, for each voter one of her top two candidates is in the committee (for edge voters
this follows from the fact that V ′ is a vertex cover and for xyz-voters this is immediate
from the construction), so local stability can only be violated if for some candidate c 6∈ S
there are at least q = 4 voters who rank c first. However, by construction each candidate
is ranked first by at most three voters.
Conversely, suppose that S is a locally stable committee of size t+ 3r. The argument
in Example 1 shows that |S∩{xj , yj, zj}| ≥ 2 for each j = 1, . . . , 1.5r. Hence, |S∩V | ≤ t.
Now, suppose that S ∩ V is not a vertex cover for G. Consider an edge {ν, ν ′} with
ν, ν ′ 6∈ S. Since G is 3-regular, there are three edge voters who rank ν first; clearly, these
voters prefer ν to each member of S. Moreover, there is an edge voter whose preference
order is ν ′ ≻ ν ≻ . . . ; this voter, too, prefers ν to each member of S. Thus, we have
identified four voters who prefer ν to S, a contradiction with the local stability of S. This
shows that S∩V is a vertex cover for G, and we have already argued that |S∩V | ≤ t.
As we have observed in the proof of Theorem 4, it is possible to verify in polynomial
time that a given committee is locally stable. This is not the case for full local stability,
as we the following theorem shows.
Theorem 5. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a committee S, it is coNP-complete to
decide whether S provides full local stability for E.
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Proof. To see that this problem is in coNP, note that a certificate for a ‘no‘-instance is
an integer ℓ ∈ [k], a set V ∗ of voters with |V ∗| =
⌊
ℓn
|S|+1
⌋
+ 1 and a set T of candidates
with |T | = ℓ such that voters in V ∗ prefer T to S.
For hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete Multicolored Clique problem [12]
to the complement of our problem. An instance ofMulticolored Clique is given by an
undirected graph G = (U, E), a positive integer s, and a mapping (coloring) g : U → [s]; it
is a ‘yes‘-instance if there exists a set of vertices {u1, . . . , us} ⊆ U with g(ui) = i for every
i ∈ [s] such that {u1, . . . , us} forms a clique in G. We write Ua to denote the neighborhood
of a vertex a ∈ U , i.e., Na = {b ∈ U | {a, b} ∈ E} and we write Ui to denote all i-colored
vertices, i.e., Ui = {u ∈ U : g(u) = i}.
We have to make a few additional assumptions, all of which do not impact the hardness
of Multicolored Clique: First, we assume that s > 2, clearly hardness remains to
hold. Further, we assume without loss of generality that s2 divides |U | and that that
|Ui| = |U |/s; this can be achieved by adding disconnected vertices. Finally, we assume that
candidates of the same color are not connected.
We construct an election as follows: Let S = {w1, w2, . . . , ws+2} and C = U ∪ S. We
refer to candidates in U as vertex candidates and we say that u is an i-colored candidate
if g(u) = i. We create a voter va for each vertex a ∈ U ; this voter’s preferences are
a ≻ Na ≻ w1 ≻ · · · ≻ ws+1 ≻ U \ (Na ∪ {a}) ≻ ws+2,
where sets are ordered arbitrarily. Let VU = {va | a ∈ U}. Furthermore, for every i, j ∈ [s]
we create a set of voters V ji of size |V
j
i | = (s+ 1) ·
|U |
s2
. For an integer z, let z denote the
number (z mod s) + 1. Voters in V ji have preferences of the form
ws+1 ≻ Ui ≻ wj ≻ Ui+1 ≻ wj+1 ≻ . . .
≻ Ui+s−1 ≻ wj+s−1 ≻ ws+2.
Let V¯ =
⋃
i,j∈[s] V
j
i . Finally, let V
′ contain |U |+ s + 1 voters of the form S ≻ U . We set
V = VU ∪ V¯ ∪V
′ and have |V | = (s+3) · |U |+ s+1. Thus, for ℓ-local stability we have a
quota of
⌊
ℓ·|V |
|S|+1
⌋
+1 = ℓ · |U |+
⌊
ℓ·(s+1)
s+3
⌋
+1. Note that we have |V ∗| ≥ ℓ · |U |+
⌊
ℓ·(s+1)
s+3
⌋
+1
if and only if |V ∗| > ℓ · |U |+ ℓ·(s+1)
s+3
; we will use this condition in the following proof. Let
us now prove that S does not provide full local stability for (C, V ) if and only if (U, E)
has a clique of size s.
Let U ′ be a multicolored clique of size s in G, i.e., for all i ∈ [s] it holds that Ci∩U
′ 6= ∅.
We will show that S violates (s+ 1)-local stability. Let us consider T = {ws+1} ∪ U
′; we
claim that a sufficient number of voters prefers T to S. Note that s voters corresponding
to U ′ prefer T to S. Furthermore, all voters in V¯ prefer T to S. In total these are
s+s2·(s+1)· |U |
s2
= (s+1)·|U |+s. We have to show that (s+1)|U |+s > (s+1)|U |+ (s+1)·(s+1)
s+3
.
This is equivalent to s(s+3) > (s+1)2, which holds for s ≥ 2. Hence S is not (s+1)-locally
stable and thus does not provide full local stability.
For the converse direction, let us make the following useful observation: if T with
|T | = ℓ contains an element that is ranked below the ℓ-th representative of voter v, then
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v does not prefer T to S. Now let us first show that S provides ℓ-local stability for
all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , s, s + 2}. To see that S provides (s + 2)-local stability, let T ⊆ C with
|T | = s+2 and let V ∗ ⊆ V be a set of the necessary size, i.e., |V ∗| > (s+2)·|U |+ (s+2)·(s+1)
s+3
.
Hence V ∗ has to contain voters from V ′. But for them an improvement is not possible
since for any v ∈ V ′, tops+2(v) = S.
To see that S is 1-locally stable, note that |VU | is lower than the quota for ℓ = 1,
|VU | <
⌊
|V |
s+3
⌋
+ 1. Voters from V¯ and from V ′ have their top-ranked candidate in S.
Hence no group of sufficient size can deviate.
For 1 < ℓ ≤ s, if T does not contain ws+1, then voters from V¯ would not deviate.
Since voter from V ′ would also not deviate either, V ∗ would be too small:
|V ∗| ≤ |VU | = |U | < 2 · |U |+
2 · (s+ 1)
s+ 3
.
Hence we can assume that ws+1 ∈ T . Then, however, voters from VU are excluded as
ws+1 is only their (s + 1)-st representative. Hence we only have to consider voters from
V¯ . Note that T has to contain at least one vertex candidate, because otherwise T ⊆ S.
Since all V ji are symmetric, we can assume without loss of generality that U1 ∩ T 6= ∅,
i.e., T contains a 1-colored vertex. We distinguish whether T ∩ {w1, . . . , ws} is empty or
not; in both cases we show that |V ∗| cannot have a sufficient size.
If T ∩ {w1, . . . , ws} 6= ∅, we assume (again without loss of generality) that w1 ∈ T .
Observe that if V ji prefers T to S, then by construction of voters in V
j
i it has to hold that
T ⊆ {ws+1} ∪ {wj, . . . , wj+ℓ−2} ∪ Ui ∪ · · · ∪ Ui+ℓ−2. (1)
Since w1 ∈ T , condition (1) implies that 1 ∈ {j, . . . , j + ℓ− 2}. Similarly, since T contains
a 1-colored vertex, condition (1) implies that 1 ∈ {i, . . . , i+ ℓ− 2}. We see that for both
i and j there are ℓ − 1 possible values. Similarly as before we infer that none of the
voters from VU prefers T to S—this is because ws+1 ∈ T , and ws+1 is only the (s + 1)-st
representative of voters in VU . Hence T (with cardinality lower than s + 1) cannot be
desirable for them. Clearly, none of the voters from V ′ prefers T to S. Thus, it follows
that
|V ∗| ≤ (ℓ− 1)2 · (s+ 1) ·
|U |
s2
≤ (ℓ− 1) · (s− 1)(s+ 1) ·
|U |
s2
< ℓ · |U |.
Hence the size of V ∗ cannot be sufficiently large.
Now we consider the case that T ∩{w1, . . . , ws} = ∅ and hence T ⊆ U ∪{ws+1}. If V
j
i
prefers T to S, then T has to contain ws+1, at least one element of Ui ∪{wj}, at least two
elements of Ui ∪ Ui+1 ∪ {wj, wj+1}, . . . , and at least ℓ− 1 elements of Ui ∪ · · · ∪ Ui+ℓ−2 ∪
{wj, . . . , wj+ℓ−2}. Since T ⊆ U ∪ {ws+1}, we can assume without loss of generality that
T ⊆ U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uℓ−1 ∪ {ws+1}. Also, without loss of generality, we can assume that T
contains a candidate from U1. This implies that only voters from V
j
1 (j arbitrary) may
prefer T to S. Now:
|V 11 ∪ · · · ∪ V
s
1 | = s(s+ 1) ·
|U |
s2
= |U |+
|U |
s2
< 2|U | ≤ ℓ|U |.
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Similarly as before, none of the voters from VU and V
′ prefers T to S. Hence, also in this
case, we have shown V ∗ cannot be sufficiently large. We conclude that S satisfies ℓ-local
stability for ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , s}.
We have established that S provides ℓ-local stability for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , s, s+2}. Hence,
if S fails full local stability, then it fails (s + 1)-local stability. Let V ∗ ⊆ V and T ⊆ C
witness that S is not (s+1)-locally stable. First, let us show that |V ∗| ≥ (s+1) · |U |+ s:
Since V ∗ witness that S is not (s+ 1)-locally stable, we know that |V ∗| > (s+ 1) · |U |+
(s+1)·(s+1)
s+3
. Note that (s+1)
2
s+3
= s − 1 + 4
s+3
. Since s > 2, |V ∗| ≥ (s + 1) · |U | + s. Since
|V ∗| ≥ (s+1) · |U |+ s and V ∗ ∩ V ′ = ∅ (no improvement is possible for voters in V ′), V ∗
has to contain at least s voters from VU . First, we show that T ∩ U contains a vertex of
every color and |T ∩U | = s. Then we are going to show that |V ∗ ∩ VU | = s. We conclude
the proof by showing that the corresponding vertices form a clique in G.
To show that T ∩U contains a vertex of every color, let us first observe that ws+1 ∈ T ;
otherwise voters in V¯ would not prefer T over S and so V ∗ would not be of sufficient size.
Since T 6⊆ S, there exists a j ∈ [s] such that wj /∈ T . Now assume towards a contradiction
that T ∩ U contains no i-colored vertices. Let x denote the number of colors which are
not used in T ; by our assumption x ≥ 1. We are going to show that in this case V ∗ is
not of sufficient size: If T contains neither i-colored vertices nor wj, then voters in V
j
i do
not prefer T to S. Thus, |V ∗| contains at most (s + 1)|U | − x(s+ 1) · |U |
s2
voters from V¯ .
Next, for i ∈ [s], if T contains an i-colored vertex, say vertex a, then only one i-colored
voter prefers T to S and that is va. This follows from the fact that i-colored vertices are
not connected; hence va is the only i-colored voter that ranks a above {w1, . . . , ws+1},
which is a necessary requirement for T (containing a) to be preferable to S. If T does not
contain an i-colored vertex, then all i-colored voters may prefer T to S; recall these are
|U |
s
many. We see that |V ∗| contains at most x · |U |
s
+(s−x) voters from VU . Further, |V
∗|
contains no voters from V ′. This yields an upper-bound on the total number of voters in
V ∗:
|V ∗| ≤ x ·
|U |
s
+ (s− x) + (s+ 1)|U | − x(s + 1) ·
|U |
s2
< s+ (s+ 1)|U |,
which yields a contradiction. Hence T ∩ U contains a vertex of every color.
Since |V ∗| ≥ s+(s+1)|U |, the set V ∗ has to contain at least s voters from VU . Observe
that voter va with g(a) = i may only prefer T to S if a ∈ T . This follows from the already
established facts that T contains an i-colored vertex and, assuming this vertex is a, va is
the only i-colored voter ranking a above {w1, . . . , ws+1}. Furthermore, if va prefers T to
S, it has to hold that T ∩U ⊆ N(a) ∪ {a}. Hence T ∩U is a clique. As T ∩U contains a
vertex of every color, T ∩ U is a multicolored clique.
Corollary 8. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a committee S, it is W[1]-hard to decide
whether S provides full local stability for E when parameterized by the committee size k.
Proof. The Multicolored Clique problem is W[1]-hard [12] and the reduction used
in the proof of Theorem 5 is a parametrized reduction (k = s+ 2).
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We have not settled the complexity of finding a committee that provides full local
stability, but we expect this problem to be computationally hard as well. More precisely,
it belongs to the second level of the polynomial hierarchy (membership verification can be
expressed as “there exists a committee such that each possible deviation by each group of
voters is not a Pareto improvement for them,” where both quantifiers operate over objects
of polynomial size); we expect the problem to be complete for this complexity class.
6 Conclusions and Research Directions
We have considered two generalizations of the notion of a Condorcet winner to the case
of multi-winner elections: the one proposed by Gehrlein [15] and Ratliff [21] and the
one defined in this paper (but inspired by the works of Aziz et al. [2] and Elkind et
al. [10]). We have provided evidence that the former approach is very majoritarian in spirit
and is well-suited for shortlisting tasks (in particular, we have shown that the objection
based on weakly Gehrlein-stable rules necessarily failing enlargement consistency does not
apply to strongly Gehrlein-stable rules). On the other hand, we have given arguments
that local stability may lead to diverse committees, whereas full local stability may lead
to committees that represent the voters proportionally. (We use qualifications such as
“may lead” instead of “leads” because, technically, (fully) local stable rules may behave
arbitrarily on elections where (fully) locally stable committees do not exist).
In our discussion, we have only very briefly mentioned rules that are either Gehrlein-
stable or locally stable. Many such rules have been defined in the literature [17], and these
rules call for a more detailed study, both axiomatic and algorithmic. Our results indicate
that weakly Gehrlein-stable and locally stable rules are unlikely to be polynomial-time
computable; it would be desirable to find practical heuristics or design efficient exponential
algorithms.
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